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ABSTRACT

Wearable augmented reality (AR) devices provide users a way to utilize computing resources while taking advantage of the
world around them through context sensitivity. These AR devices, utilizing traditional technologies such as wi-fi and webbrowsers, often rely on users to enter an alphanumeric username and password via a keyboard mechanism provided by the
device. We explore the security of a head-worn wearable AR device and keyboard mechanism available in the Microsoft
Hololens. Specifically, we explore the feasibility of password compromise through a shoulder surfing attack, the unknown
observation of a user during the password entry process. We find that from a set of commonly used passwords, it is relatively
easy to identify the password the user entered through recorded observation of the process. Additionally, when it was attempted
to obfuscate the finger used to select the character in the AR keyboard, it was still possible to develop a guess as to what
password was entered, as the user’s head motions used in the character selection process were still observable.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION

Information security is an area of research that information systems researchers can, and should contribute to (Zafar and Clark
2009). Specifically, studies of password security in the context of threat mitigation/password crack times (Cazier and Medlin
2006), the characteristics of user-selected passwords (Zviran and Haga 1999), and behavioral concerns (Kreider and Rao 2010)
have all fallen into the realm of information systems research. As new technologies enter the market, such as wearable devices
for virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR), passwords find themselves used in new ways that have not yet been
explored from a research perspective. As the applications for these technologies have found usage in military (Azuma et al.
2001; LaViola et al. 2015) and surgical contexts (Cui et al. 2017), the security of these devices becomes an area of increasing
interest. In this context, information systems researchers can, and should continue to extend information security research. Of
particular interest is the risk of password discoverability in the use of augmented reality wearable computers.
A wearable computer, referred to as a “wearable” or “wearable device” can take a variety of forms from small wristwatches,
to large backpack computers, and a variety of devices in between. The elements of a wearable are their mobile nature, the
ability to augment reality and provide awareness of user surroundings through context sensitivity, with a common type of
augmented reality device being a head-worn display (Azuma et al. 2001; Billinghurst and Starner 1999).

Figure 1. A User Wearing an Head-Worn Augmented
Reality Wearable Device
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In this study, we explore a head-worn wearable augmented reality headset, specifically in the context of how users enter
passwords to authenticate themselves to a variety of services, including web sign-on, and protected wi-fi networks. In this
study, we seek to explore the following research questions, specifically demonstrating proof of concept that it may be possible
to discover a user’s password by observing them during the entry process, a technique known as shoulder surfing (Tari et al.
2006). Additionally, while traditional password entry methods such as keyboards/pin pads allows a conscientious user to take
counter measures against shoulder surfing, we believe due to the nature of password entry with a wearable augmented reality
device, that obfuscation of the password entry process may be difficult or impossible, leading to our two primary research
questions.
RQ1: Is it possible to discover the password a user entered using a wearable augmented reality device by observing the user
from the front and tracking their head/hand movements?
RQ2: Is it possible to discover the password a user entered using a wearable augmented reality device by observing the user
from other angles and tracking their head/hand movement?
For this study, we seek to demonstrate that the concept is possible, and thus focus on a very limited number of commonly used
passwords using a wearable AR device utilizing a virtual QWERTY keyboard. We seek to demonstrate that an observer with
appropriate equipment and time would be capable of recording the password entry process, and identifying the password that
was entered through tracking head and hand motions of the user entering the password.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows. We will first perform a brief literature review on password security,
augmented reality devices, and security research at the intersection of these two areas. We will then provide a detailed
discussion of the password entry procedure for the specific wearable AR device chosen for this study, as well as the mechanisms
used for recording and analyzing the password entry procedure. We will then provide a discussion of our results, specifically
identifying answers to our research questions posed above. Finally, we will draw conclusions from our work, and provide
suggestions for future research which may help expand this line of research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Password Security

The use of passwords as a mechanism to protect information in digital environments has long been considered standard
(Hoffman 1969; Renaud and De Angeli 2009). Since the first uses of the password, a variety of weaknesses that undermine
the security it provides have been researched extensively (De Luca et al. 2014; Morris and Thompson 1979; Pinkas and Sander
2002; Spafford 1992). Additionally, a variety of ways to overcome this weakness by providing other types of knowledge based
authentication such as pass-algorithms (Haskett 1984), passphrases (Kurzban 1985), cognitive passwords (Zviran and Haga
1990), graphical passwords (Suo et al. 2005) and musical passwords (Gibson et al. 2009) have been explored, but have not
reached the wide use currently experienced by traditional passwords (Furnell 2005).
One particular weakness in passwords is known as shoulder surfing, which occurs when a user authenticating themselves with
a password is observed during the password entry process, generally without their knowledge (Tari et al. 2006). Users using
keyboards and pin pads for authentication can take counter measures such as obfuscating their hands during the password entry
process, and protecting their immediate vicinity to help ensure that they are not being observed. The risks of shoulder surfing
in password entry have been explored specifically in the context of different forms of knowledge-based authentication including
traditional and graphical passwords (Tari et al. 2006) and drawmetric authentication on smart phones (De Luca et al. 2014)

Figure 2. Drawmetric representation of the password “admin” overlaid on a keyboard

One type of password entry mechanism explored in the context of shoulder surfing is referred to as a drawmetric authentication.
Drawmetric authentication substitutes alphanumeric passwords with graphical alternatives in which a user draws a pattern
chosen during enrollment (De Luca et al. 2014). We argue that alphanumeric passwords entered on a traditional qwerty
keyboard can be represented in a graphical form, similar to the drawmetric form by drawing lines between the chosen characters
of an alphanumeric password as demonstrated in figure 2, referred to as the Keyboard Drawmetric Profile.
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Augmented Reality

A wearable computer, referred to as a “wearable” or “wearable device” can take a variety of forms from small wristwatches,
to large backpack computers, and a variety of devices in between. The elements of a wearable are their mobile nature, the
ability to augment reality and provide awareness of user surroundings through context sensitivity (Billinghurst and Starner
1999). Augmented reality devices can take many forms, including projection displays, handheld displays and head-worn
displays (Azuma et al. 2001). Head-worn displays provide the ability for a user to wear a modern computing device capable of
enabling the physical world to be overlaid with graphics, text and sound (Starner et al. 1997). One aspect of augmented reality
is the ability to provide alphanumeric input to the device via a keyboard interface, which has seen many different approaches
to implementation (Van Krevelen and Poelman 2010).
Augmented Reality and Password Security

Roesner et al. (2014) note that personal displays such as those provided in augmented reality devices provide a strong defense
against shoulder surfing type attacks, but do not go into details as to the mechanics of how the characters of the password are
located and selected other than mentioning a haptic sensor for discreet input. In situations where input was less discreet, we
are unsure of how strong a defense this type of display would provide. Finally, other researchers have explored methods for
reducing the risk of shoulder surfing in AR devices (Roesner et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2017), however, these studies did not
identify and demonstrate the potential feasibility and mechanisms of such an attack on an AR device, and their solutions
required additional hardware solutions to assist with the password entry process.
METHODOLOGY
Password Entry in AR

The AR device we used for this study is a developer edition Microsoft Hololens. This wearable device is a completely mobile
head-worn augmented reality device. This device provides the ability to connect to local wi-fi networks, as well as browse the
web through a web browser application. This combination of technologies enables activities such as checking e-mail, reviewing
banking information and any other activities capable on a modern web browser.
The device utilizes gesture recognition to enable the user to interact with the digital artifacts projected into the world around
them, of specific interest to this study, a QWERTY keyboard. For the user to interact, they must utilize one of the pre-defined
hand gestures, and the gesture must be in the purview of the forward mounted cameras on the front of the device. Users entering
alphanumeric information for a variety of purposes, including password entry for protected wi-fi and web login, are presented
with a QWERTY keyboard in the augmented reality space. To select a character, the user centers the view of the device on the
letter to be selected, indicated by a small circle in the AR view, and performs an air tap gesture to select the character. The air
tap gesture must be performed with a single finger, and must be in the purview of the front-facing cameras the device uses for
gesture capture, but does not need to be anywhere near the actual key being entered. The user repeats the process, re-centering
their head and the device to select additional characters until the password entry has been completed. Once the process is
complete, the user selects the “X close” key in the upper right of the keyboard to end text entry.

Figure 3. Augmented Reality View of Keyboard and Finger During Character Entry for a WI-FI password

In this system, while the keyboard is only visible to the AR user, all external aspects of the password entry are easily visible
and difficult to obfuscate. It is difficult to obfuscate the rotation of the head as the user changes the location of their head to
select each subsequent character, and it is difficult to obfuscate the character selection gesture, which must be within the view
of the cameras the device uses to capture gestures.
Observation of Password Entry in AR

Augmented Reality (AR) wearable devices provide users an opportunity to enhance their view of the world around them
through superimposed images on top of what is currently being observed through context sensitivity (Billinghurst and Starner
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1999). This allows the user to continue to interact with the world around them, as opposed to closed world virtual reality
devices. This ability of the user to perform computing tasks in augmented reality while also interacting with the world around
them provides unique opportunities for the AR user to be observed. For example, an AR user could wear a headset while sitting
in a waiting room to check email, perform online banking or otherwise browse the web. This increased observability of the
user enables ample opportunities for the user’s actions to be observed, and possibly recorded. Should a user be recorded during
the process of entering a password, the observer would then be capable of analyzing that specific activity repeatedly giving
increased opportunity and time to discover the password that was entered.
To answer our research questions we recorded a user entering several commonly used passwords, first with a direct observation,
then from a variety of different angles. Our recording of the user was done in controlled settings, with the user sitting in a
stationary location, centered on the recording device, with a clean white background behind. The recordings of each password
entry were then used to trace a graphical profile of the head motion and hand actions the user took during the password entry
process, referred to as the AR Drawmetric Profile. The passwords were selected from the list of worst passwords from 2016
(Bruner 2017), and included the following passwords: password, football, qwerty, login, welcome, solo, admin, dragon, hottie
and master.
Each artifact of the password entry process, including the videos and drawmetric profiles were given keys derived from the
respective passwords md5 hash. This allowed each drawmetric profile to be blinded from an observer matching it, while still
allowing them to be linked to the original password that was entered.
Discovery of Password Entry in AR

To answer the first research question, we started with observations where the user was recorded with the observer viewing
them from the front, with full view of the center of their device, and hand movements. This was done with multiple passwords
as described in the above methodology resulting in a total of 10 recorded observations. We then performed the following steps
for each password.
1.
2.

Keyboard Drawmetric Profile: Manually identify a drawmetric (graphical) representation of an alphanumeric
password as if it would have been entered on a traditional QWERTY keyboard by drawing a line between each
character that would be typed to enter the password successfully.
AR Drawmetric Profile: Manually identify a drawmetric (graphical) representation of the password entered by the
user through recordings of their head and hand movements during the password entry process by identifying spatially
where each character selection activity occurs, and connecting the lines between them with the shortest distance
between the two points.

Once these were created for all password entries, the experimenter utilized blinded copies of the keyboard drawmetric profiles
with the background keyboard image removed, and the AR drawmetric profiles derived from the recorded videos, and organized
them into two piles: pile A and pile B. Then, each drawmetric representation in pile A was manually matched with an associated
drawmetric representation in pile B, and it was noted how long and the process that was taken to identify and confirm matches
between the pairs. Once the matches were completed, the original key with the blinded values was consulted to determine the
accuracy of the matching.

Figure 4. Three different drawmetric representations of the password “admin”

To answer the second research question, we selected a single password, “password” from our selection of most popular
passwords, and repeated the above steps adjusting the camera angle in 45° increments rotationally completing a full 360° of
observations, resulting in 8 observations. We then manually observed and converted these recordings to AR drawmetric
profiles and compared them against the keyboard drawmetric profile. For this portion, we performed analysis on the resultant
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AR drawmetric profiles to identify differences in the profiles at varying angles, with respect to the original keyboard
drawmetric, and any major differences in versions that would make it more difficult to uncover the original password.
RESULTS

We found that with respect to our first research question that it was consistently possible to match the AR dramwetric profile
derived from observing the user entering the password with the keyboard generated drawmetric profile, with 100% match rate.
Additionally, we found that, the time to accurately identify the match increased with the complexity of the password,
specifically when the resulting drawmetric had many crossing lines or repeating characters.

Figure 5. A Drawmetric With Many Crossing Lines Such as “football” (left) and One Without Such as “qwerty” (right)

Even though it took longer, to match the more complex passwords, it was relatively easy to identify the number of keys entered
and the relative length of the transitions between keys, which made it easy to accurately match, even when the scale of the
manually generated AR drawmetric profiles differed from the keyboard generated profile.
For the second research question, we found that, as the angle of the user entering the password rotates away from the observer,
it becomes more difficult to identify the length of head movement between characters with respect to the finger entering the
password. Despite this, the AR drawmetric profiles were still recognizable when compared to the keyboard drawmetric profile.
The one exception was 180° where the users finger for entering the password was completely obfuscated by the back of their
head. For this scenario, we were unable to determine when a character was being entered, but we could tell temporally how
long was spent in each relative area. When creating the drawmetric for this scenario, we modeled the length of time in each
area by a larger full circle, as shown in figure 6.

Figure 6. 180° finger obfuscated profile (left) and 90° finger visible profile (right)
CONCLUSION

This paper was designed to provide proof of concept of a potential mechanism through which shoulder surfing, the observation
of a user entering a password without their knowledge, could result in discovery of a password that was entered in an AR
wearable device. We found being able to observe a user entering a password on a virtual qwerty keyboard in a head worn AR
device does introduce realistic possibilities for a successful shoulder surfing attack. Additionally, that attack can be completed
with minimal additional technology, requiring only a video camera and manual observation. With the combination of these, it
was easy to develop the AR drawmetric profile, a graphical representation of the head and hand movements during the password
entry process, which could then be compared to a similar profile generated from a preexisting keyboard. Additionally, even
when the user attempts to obfuscate their finger, used to determine when a key was selected when generating the AR drawmetric
profile, an attack could still likely be completed by tracking the relative amount of time a user spends in each area before
moving their head to select another character.
These findings are limited in that we only explored a small subset of potential passwords from a commonly used set of
passwords, and that all analysis was performed manually. Future studies seek to perform a more rigorous exploration of this
phenomena. Potential approaches could include developing automated mechanisms for translating user head and hand motion
into profiles for analysis, as well automated comparison of the drawmetric signatures to identify the statistical likelihood of a
specific password being the one the user entered. Additional research could explore potential countermeasures, such as whether
additional devices like handheld clickers used to make character selections would decrease the accuracy of any models of
password discovery.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank Keith Perkins for kindly sharing his AR devices, which allowed this research to be performed.

Proceedings of the Southern Association for Information Systems Conference, Atlanta, GA, USA March 23rd–24th, 2018

5

Kreider

Password Discoverability in Augmented Reality

REFERENCES

Azuma, R., Baillot, Y., Behringer, R., Feiner, S., Julier, S., and MacIntyre, B. (2001). "Recent Advances in Augmented
Reality," IEEE computer graphics and applications (21:6), pp. 34-47.
Billinghurst, M., and Starner, T. (1999). "Wearable Devices: New Ways to Manage Information," Computer (32:1), pp. 57-64.
Bruner, R. (2017). "The 25 Worst Passwords You Should Never Use," in: TIME. Online.
Cazier, J. A., and Medlin, B. D. (2006). "How Secure Is Your Password? An Analysis of E-Commerce Passwords and Their
Crack Times," Journal of Information System Security (2:3), pp. 69-82.
Cui, N., Kharel, P., and Gruev, V. (2017). "Augmented Reality with Microsoft Hololens Holograms for near Infrared
Fluorescence Based Image Guided Surgery," Molecular-Guided Surgery: Molecules, Devices, and Applications III:
International Society for Optics and Photonics, p. 100490I.
De Luca, A., Harbach, M., von Zezschwitz, E., Maurer, M.-E., Slawik, B. E., Hussmann, H., and Smith, M. (2014). "Now You
See Me, Now You Don't: Protecting Smartphone Authentication from Shoulder Surfers," Proceedings of the SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems: ACM, pp. 2937-2946.
Furnell, S. (2005). "Authenticating Ourselves: Will We Ever Escape the Password?," Network Security (2005:3), pp. 8-13.
Gibson, M., Renaud, K., Conrad, M., and Maple, C. (2009). "Musipass: Authenticating Me Softly with "My" Song," in:
Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop. Oxford, United Kingdom: ACM.
Haskett, J. A. (1984). "Pass-Algorithms: A User Validation Scheme Based on Knowledge of Secret Algorithms,"
Communications of the ACM (27:8), pp. 777-781.
Hoffman, L. J. (1969). "Computers and Privacy: A Survey," ACM Comput. Surv. (1:2), pp. 85-103.
Kreider, C., and Rao, V. S. (2010). "User Acceptance of Multiple Password Systems: A Proposed Study," Americas Conference
on Information Systems, Lima, Peru.
Kurzban, S. A. (1985). "Easily Remembered Passphrases: A Better Approach," SIGSAC Rev. (3:2-4), pp. 10-21.
LaViola, J., Williamson, B., Brooks, C., Veazanchin, S., Sottilare, R., and Garrity, P. (2015). "Using Augmented Reality to
Tutor Military Tasks in the Wild," Proceedings of the Interservice/Industry Training Simulation & Education
Conference, Orlando, Florida.
Morris, R., and Thompson, K. (1979). "Password Security: A Case History," Commun. ACM (22:11), pp. 594-597.
Pinkas, B., and Sander, T. (2002). "Securing Passwords against Dictionary Attacks," in: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security. Washington, DC, USA: ACM.
Renaud, K., and De Angeli, A. (2009). "Visual Passwords: Cure-All or Snake-Oil?," Communications of the ACM (52:12), pp.
135-140.
Roesner, F., Kohno, T., and Molnar, D. (2014). "Security and Privacy for Augmented Reality Systems," Communications of
the ACM (57:4), pp. 88-96.
Spafford, E. H. (1992). "Opus: Preventing Weak Password Choices," Computers & Security (11:3), pp. 273-278.
Starner, T., Mann, S., Rhodes, B., Levine, J., Healey, J., Kirsch, D., Picard, R. W., and Pentland, A. (1997). "Augmented
Reality through Wearable Computing," Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments (6:4), pp. 386-398.
Suo, X., Zhu, Y., and S., O. G. (2005). "Graphical Passwords: A Survey," Computer Security Applications Conference, 21st
Annual, pp. 10 pp.-472.
Tari, F., Ozok, A., and Holden, S. H. (2006). "A Comparison of Perceived and Real Shoulder-Surfing Risks between
Alphanumeric and Graphical Passwords," Proceedings of the second symposium on Usable privacy and security:
ACM, pp. 56-66.
Van Krevelen, D., and Poelman, R. (2010). "A Survey of Augmented Reality Technologies, Applications and Limitations,"
International Journal of Virtual Reality (9:2), p. 1.
Zafar, H., and Clark, J. G. (2009). "Current State of Information Security Research in Is," Communications of the Association
for Information Systems (24:34), pp. 557-596.
Zhang, R., Zhang, N., Du, C., Lou, W., Hou, Y. T., and Kawamoto, Y. (2017). "Augauth: Shoulder-Surfing Resistant
Authentication for Augmented Reality," Communications (ICC), 2017 IEEE International Conference on: IEEE, pp.
1-6.
Zviran, M., and Haga, W. (1999). "Password Security: An Empirical Study," Journal of Management Information Systems
(15:4), pp. 161-185.
Zviran, M., and Haga, W. J. (1990). "User Authentication by Cognitive Passwords: An Empirical Assessment," Information
Technology, 1990. 'Next Decade in Information Technology', Proceedings of the 5th Jerusalem Conference on (Cat.
No.90TH0326-9), pp. 137-144.

Proceedings of the Southern Association for Information Systems Conference, Atlanta, GA, USA March 23rd–24th, 2018

6

